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THE PERMISSIBILITY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
IN HIGHER EDUCATION UNDER
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Jordanj Paustt
International human rights are the supreme law of the land,
and thus are a legitimate and valuable source of the permissibility
of affirmative action.' This source is not only found in federal law
relevant to decision making at federal and state levels, but is also
found in federal policy which is relevant to the issue of federal pre-
emption. Treaty-based permissibility does not however guarantee
that particular measures of affirmative action will survive chal-
lenges under other constitutional provisions, but it is relevant to an
evolving theory of constitutional rights. Indeed, treaty-based per-
missibility of affirmative action, coupled with other relevant
sources, provide the basis for a compelling state interest for both
federal and state initiatives, especially concerning higher
education.-
A. BACKGROUND: TREATY-BASED PERMISSIBILITy
This essay will address two primary treaties: the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights3 (ICCPR) and the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination4  (Race Discrimination Convention). Despite the
general prohibition in each treaty of "discrimination" and "distinc-
t Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston Law Center; J.S.D. Candidate,
Yale University; L.L.M., 1972, University of Virginia; J.D., 1968, University of Califor-
nia at Los Angeles; B.A., 1965, University of California at Los Angeles. A shorter ver-
sion of this paper was presented at Bringing It Home: Building International Human
Rights Law, Advocacy and Culture, A Conference to Mark the 50th Anniversary of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, held at the City University of New York School of Law,
I May-3 May 1998.
1 SeeJordan J. Paust, Race-Based Affirmative Action and International Law, 18 MIcH. J.
INT'L L. 659, 659 (1997).
2 See id.
3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. The United States ratified the Covenant on Sep-
tember 8, 1992. See RJcHARD B. LILLICH & HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAl. HUMAN
RIGHTS 261 (3d ed. 1995).
4 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter Race Discrimina-
tion Convention]. The treaty was ratified by the United States on November 20, 1994.
See LILLICH & HANNUM, supra note 3, at 269.
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tions" on the basis of race, the treaties recognize the permissibility
of "differentiation" to promote affirmative action.
With respect to the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee cre-
ated by the treaty, recognized that "[n]ot every differentiation of
treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such dif-
ferentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to
achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant."6 The
Committee added:
[T]he principle of equality sometimes requires States parties to
take affirmative action in order to diminish or eliminate condi-
tions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination prohib-
ited by the [ICCPR] .... Such action may involve granting for a
time . . . certain preferential treatment in specific matters....
[A]s long as such action is needed to correct discrimination in
fact, it is a case of legitimate differentiation under the [ICCPR] .7
Further, when ratifying the ICCPR, the United States adopted the
"Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,"8 [Report or Under-
standing]. This formal Understanding permits certain forms of
affirmative action. It states in pertinent part: "The United States
understands distinctions based upon race . . . -as those terms are
used in Article 2, paragraph 1 and Article 26-to be permitted
[when] such distinctions are, at [a] minimum, rationally related to
a legitimate governmental objective."9
In a previous essay, I documented why the "Understanding"
5 See Paust, supra note 1, at 661-63, 667-71.
6 Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human
Rights Treaty Bodies, Hum. Rts. Comm. General Comment No. 18, 1 13, at 27, U.N.
Doc. HRI/GEN/1 (1992).
7 Id. at 10, at 27.
8 United States: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, 31 I.L.M. 645 (May 1992) (earlier draft, adopted later
by the Senate and President) (reproduced from U.S. Senate Exec. Rep. 102-23 (102d
Cong., 2d Sess.)) [hereinafter Senate Committee Report]. In the Report, it was noted
that the Committee created by the Covenant had interpreted the Covenant to allow
certain forms of "differentiation:"
In interpreting the relevant Covenant provisions, the Human Rights
Committee has observed that not all differentiation in treatment consti-
tutes discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are reason-
able and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is
legitimate tinder the Covenant. In its General Comment on nondis-
crimination, for example, the Committee noted that the enjoyment of
rights and freedoms on an equal footing does not mean identical treat-
ment in every instance.
Id. at 655; see Paust, supra note 1, at 662-63 n.12.
9 Senate Committee Report, supra note 8, at 655.
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operates as a reservation to the Covenant and why this reservation
is compatible with the object and purpose of the ICCPR, as well as
its authoritative interpretation by the Human Rights Committee. " '
As such, the Understanding affirms that certain forms of race-
based affirmative action are permitted as a matter of United States
treaty law, that is, they are permitted whenever such distinctions
are rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective."
Moreover, at a minimum, the Report is a formal expression of fed-
eral policy expressing the permissibility of affirmative action.' 2
The other significant treaty, the Race Discrimination Conven-
tion," is clearly useful as supreme federal law authorizing certain
forms of race-based affirmative action. As its name suggests, the
treaty contains general provisions outlawing racial discrimination.
Nevertheless, certain "special measures," which may include race-
based affirmative action, are expressly excluded from the defini-
tion of proscribed racial "discrimination." For example, the Racial
Discrimination Convention states in paragraph 4 of Article 1:
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing ade-
quate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individ-
uals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to
ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise
of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be
deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that such
measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of
separate rights for different racial groups and that they shall not
be continued after the objectives for which they were taken have
been achieved."4
There is no exception or limitation expressly related to this article
elsewhere in the treaty. Indeed, the statement of Conrad K.
Harper, a Legal Adviser at the United States Department of State,
concerning ratification of the treaty, included the following assess-
ment: "[A]rticle 1 (4) explicitly exempts 'special measures' taken
for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain
racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection.
As a result, the Convention leaves undisturbed existing U.S. law
regarding affirmative action programs." 15
10 See Paust, supra note 1, at 662-64.
11 See Paust, supra note 1, at 664.
12 See Paust, supra note 1, at 664.
13 Race Discrimination Convention, supra note 4.
14 Race Discrimination Convention, supra note 4, arts. 2-4, 6, at 216-18, 222.
15 Conrad K. Harper, Statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
(May 11, 1994), in Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law,
88 AM.J. NT'L L. 721, 722 (1994).
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Article 2 of the Race Discrimination Convention lends support
to the propriety of certain special measures, even creating duties to
take special and concrete measures of affirmative action "when the
circumstances so warrant." 6 Furthermore, Article 5 may be inter-
preted to prohibit "discrimination" and "distinctions," but not
"differentiations." 7 Nor are "special measures" for adequate ad-
vancement of racial or ethnic groups and individuals mandated.' 8
As Professors McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen aptly summarize:
The Convention's broad formulation of forbidden acts is not,
however, intended to prescribe that all differentiations are un-
lawful discriminations. The differences made impermissible are
those which fail to establish a demonstrable, rational relation to
individual potentialities for self-development and contribution
to the aggregate common interest. The basic requirement of
rationality, that is, an absence of arbitrariness, is implicit in the
reference in Article 1 (1) . . . and is made explicit in Articles 1
(4) and 2 (2).'t
Thus, it can be recognized that the use of the terms "distinction"
and "discrimination" in the ICCRP and the Race Discrimination
Convention require the conclusion that not all forms of differentia-
tion 20 are impermissible, and that race-based affirmative action
may be required under both treaties.2'
B. CERTAIN METHODS OF INCORPORATION
Given the permissibility of affirmative action under the treaties
as they are incorporated in United States law, how may one use
16 Race Discrimination Convention, supra note 4, art. 2 (2).
17 See Paust, supra note 1, at 667.
18 See Paust, supra note 1, at 667.
19 MvRs S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORML PUBLIC ORDER: THE
BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 596 (1980); see Dr. W.A.
McKean, The Meaning of Discrimination in International and Municipal Law, 44 BrT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 177, 185-86 (1970) ("[I]n international legal usage, 'discrimination' has
come to acquire a special meaning. It does not mean any distinction or differentia-
tion but only arbitrary, invidious or unjustified distinctions .... Moreover, it does not
forbid special measures of protection .... In this respect, the definition accepted in
the international sphere is more advanced and sophisticated than that adopted in
most municipal legal systems."); see also South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber.
v. S. Afr.) (Second Phase), 1966 I.C.J. 4, 306 (July 18) (TanakaJ., dissenting) (justice
may require different treatment).
20 The term "differentiation" seems preferable in order to emphasize the special
meanings that pertain concerning both treaties. For a discussion on the use of such a
term or "differential," see Paust, supra note 1, at 662-63 n.12, 667 n.29.
21 See Race Discrimination Convention, supra note 4, art. 2(2) (Article 2 of the
Race Discrimination Convention also mandates affirmative action "when the circum-
stances so warrant").
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human rights law to provide more meaningful and effective equal-
ity of opportunities in higher education? Here, I will address three
strategies which, I term: (1) the interpretive approach; (2) the pri-
macy and preemption approach; and (3) the enhancement and
protection of state implementary choice approach.
1. The Interpretive Approach
The first method involves the utilization of treaty law as an aid
for interpretation and enhancement of constitutional rights, du-
ties, and powers, thus, a form of indirect incorporation.22 Through
this method, the treaty-based permissibility of affirmative action
and related duties can be used to influence constitutional norms,
an approach that should prove useful against attempted extensions
of Hopwood v. Texas.23
For example, when considering the phrase "equal protection"
(found in both the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article 26 of the ICCPR), one would utilize treaty
interpretations that clearly allow for certain forms of affirmative
action. The word "protection" should be interpreted in a manner
that allows for certain measures of affirmative action to promote an
"equal" and effective "protection" against ongoing discrimina-
tion. 24  Further, since international law is supreme law of the
United States, the Fourteenth Amendment should be interpreted
to preclude any state from denying "the equal protection of the
laws" by failing to recognize the protection of treaty laws embodied
22 See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 34,
83, 108, 112-13, 191-96, 246, 248-56 (1996); Connie de la Vega, Civil Rights During the
1990s: New Treaty Law Could Help Immensely, 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 423, 462 (1997).
23 78 F.3d 932, reh k denied, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2580
(1996). Even Hopwood did not require that laws treat and protect each person at every
social moment in exactly the same way. See id. at 946-47. The latter approach might
lead to a denial of the constitutional propriety of any laws protecting special interests
or distinctions, such as certain tax codes, welfare laws, pollution laws, laws providing
government subsidies, laws providing judicial and official immunities, and laws con-
cerning the selection of judges.
24 Both "equality" and "protection" should be viewed as processes and judged with
reference to all relevant interests and legal policies at stake. Thus, equality should be
viewed in context and through time, not merely in connection with isolated circum-
stances, a limited number of persons, or a particular moment in time. Such an ap-
proach will allow fuller inquiry into various interconnected legal policies at stake and
the consequences of choice. For example, a deeper, richer understanding of equality
and protection of the laws in connection with law school admission processes will
involve attention to many more features of context than mathmaticized weightings of
grade point averages (which are themselves products of diverse institutions, majors,
and educational experiences) and LSAT scores.
19981
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in permissible affirmative action.25
Treaty-based permissibility of affirmative action provides the
necessary compelling state interest component of the strict scrutiny
test applied to racial classifications, 26 especially coupled with the
United States' duties under Article 2 of the Race Discrimination
Convention.2 7  Moreover, the United States Constitution's
Supremacy Clause obligates the states to the treaties so that the
dual duties and interests provide a greater compulsion of state in-
terest.28 Even in Hopwood, several judges stressed that diversity in
higher education can be a compelling state interest.29 Treaty-
based permissibility of affirmative action and duties to take special
and concrete measures must necessarily enhance such a
recognition.
2. The Primacy and Preemption Approaches
Another method for the permissibility of affirmative action in-
volves the utilization of the Supremacy Clause3' to override state or
25 Concerning the use of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect human rights, see
PAUST, supra note 22, at 179-80, 186, 193, 196, 237, 244, 248, 255-56, 315. See Myres S.
McDougal & Richard Arens, The Genocide Convention and the Constitution, 3 VAND. L.
REv. 683, 708 (1950).
26 SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 231-32 (1995).
27 See Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1462-63 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (in a First Amend-
ment analysis, a compelling governmental interest is supported by United States obli-
gations under international law), revd in part and affd in part sub nom; see alsoJewish
Defense League, Inc. v. Washington, 347 F. Supp. 1300, 1301 (D.D.C. 1972) ("para-
mount governmental interest" of protecting persons and property of diplomats stems
from international law); 1 U.S. Op. Att'y Gen. 52, 52-53 (1794) ("[domestic] law is
strengthened by the law of nations"); de la Vega, supra note 22, at 468, 470 (arguing
treaty obligations may constitute a compelling state interest). But cf Bullfrog Films,
Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 512 (9th Cir. 1988) (The government did not advance a
compelling state interest and "[c]ertainly the existence of a Treaty does not by itselfjustify content-based discrimination in violation of the First Amendment" (citing Boos
v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988))).
28 See de la Vega, supra note 22, at 468, 470. Professor de la Vega states: "The treaty
obligations themselves can constitute a compelling state interest. This is particularly
true for the United States government, which has affirmative obligations under [the
Race Discrimination Convention.]" Id. at 468 (footnote ommitted). She adds:
"[S] tates and local entities are also obligated... [T] hat obligation can be the basis of
the compelling state interest for affirmative action programs." id.
29 See 78 F.3d at 964-65 (Wiener, J., concurring) (diversity may be a compelling
interest); 84 F.3d 720, 724 & n.l (5th Cir. 1996) (Politz, J., dissenting) ("student
body diversity is a compelling governmental interest for the purposes of strict scru-
tiny"); id. at 725 (Stewart, J, dissenting) (arguing that the panel majority should not
have reached the issue of whether diversity is an appropriate admissions criterion)
(emphasis added).
30 The Supremacy Clause reads in pertinent part: "all Treaties ... shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
[Vol. 3:91
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local attempts to outlaw affirmative action. The ICCPR and Race
Discrimination Convention are supreme law of the land, thus,
under the Supremacy Clause and the doctrine of federal preemp-
tion, the treaties' permissibility of affirmative action should trump
inconsistent state law or policy.3 As the Supreme Court empha-
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
31 See Paust, supra note 1, at 671. There, I also note that although the instrument
of ratification for each treaty contains a declaration that many of the articles are "non-
self-executing," such declarations function as reservations that are fundamentally in-
consistent with the objects and purposes of the treaties and, under international law,
are thus void ab initio. See Paust, supra note 1 at 671 & n. 43-44; PAUST, supra note 22,
at 361-86. Moreover, the declaration concerning the International Covenant merely
addresses Articles 1-27 and expressly does not apply to Article 50. Article 50 man-
dates: "The provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to all parts of federal
States without any limitations or exceptions." Such "shall" language is mandatory and
self-executory. See also PAUST, supra note 22, at 55-59, 62, 69-71, 74, 110, 112; Senate
Committee Report, supra note 8, at 656-57 ("the Covenant will apply to state and local au-
thorities [and will be implemented] by appropriate ... judicial means, federal or state
.") (emphasis added).
Even if the treaties are not void ab initio, the declarations should be interpreted
to preserve rights, since treaties are to be construed liberally to protect express and
implied rights. See, e.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933); Nielsen
v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 51 (1929); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 (1928);
Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924) ("Treaties are to be construed in a
broad and liberal spirit, and, when two constructions are possible, one restrictive of
rights that may be claimed under it and the other favorable to them, the latter is to be
preferred.") (citations omitted); United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446, 448-49 (1924)
("Construing the treaty liberally in favor of the rights claimed tinder it, as we are
bound to do .... ) (citation omitted); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 272 (1890);
Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 487 (1879) ("Where a treaty admits of two con-
structions, one restrictive as to the rights, that may be claimed under it, and the other
liberal, the latter is to be preferred.") (citation omitted); Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 242, 249 (1830) ("If the treaty admits of two interpretations, and one is limited,
and the other liberal; one which will further, and the other exclude private rights;
why should not the most liberal exposition be adopted?"); PAUST, supra note 22, at 72
n.83, 110 n.13.
Further, because the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution includes all trea-
ties, a declaration of non-self-execution is unavoidably unconstitutional and void
under the Supremacy Clause. See, e.g. PAUST, supra note 22, at 51, 55, 59, 63-64, 370-
71; Malvina Halberstam, United States Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 31 GEO. WAsH.J. INT'L L. & ECON. 49, 64, 67-
69 (1997). Certainly a mere declaration by the President, even with fill consent of
the Senate, cannot alter a constitutional command.
Importantly also, the declaration concerning the Covenant is not a general decla-
ration of non-self-execution, but one that is expressly limited and does not inhibit the
reach of Article 50. Further, it has a special and limited meaning: merely "to clarify
that the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in U.S. courts." Senate Com-
mittee Report, supra note 8, at 657. Thus, even if the declaration was operative, the
Senate Committee Report assures that the declaration does not make the Covenant
generally non-self-executing (i.e., it was intended to be partly self-executing) and that
it does not generally inhibit the legal status of the Covenant as supreme federal law
1998]
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sized in United States v. Pink,3 2 "state law must yield when it is incon-
sistent with, or impairs the policy or provisions of, a treaty ...
[and] must give way before the superior Federal policy evidenced
by a treaty[.]" 3-
This constitutional mandate is supplemented by Article 50 of
the ICCPR which requires that the treaty has the force of law in all
parts of the United States "without any limitations or exceptions."34
for use by federal and state courts, as long as the Covenant is not used directly to
create a cause of action.
Even if portions were "non-self-executing" in a general sense or in the special
sense preferred by the Executive upon adoption (relating merely to the creation of a
private cause of action directly under the treaties), the treaties should still trump in-
consistent state law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the
doctrine of federal preemption. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649-50 (1948)
(BlackJ., concurring) (human rights articles in the U.N. Charter, which to date have
not been found to be self-executing, provide additional reasons why a California law
"stands as an obstacle to the free accomplishment of our policy in the international
field" and cannot prevail); id. at 673 (Murphy, J., concurring) ("Its inconsistency with
the Charter ...is but one more reason why the statute must be condemned.");
Gordon v. Kerr, 10 F. Cas. 801, 802 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806) (No. 5,611) (stating that a
seemingly non-self-executing treaty "is supreme" over a state constitution); 6 Op. Att'y
Gen. 291, 293 (1854) (held that all treaties are supreme law over that of the states-
even those requiring "enactment of a statute to regulate the details"); PAUST, supra
note 22, at 62-64, 68, 97, 134-35; Louis B. SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNA-
TIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 947 (1973); BuRNs H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 192 (1980); de la Vega, supra note 22, at 457 n.206,
460, 467, 470; Joan Fitzpatrick, The Preemptive and Interpretive Force of International
Human Rights Law in State Courts, 90 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 262, 264 (1996); Louis
Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion
and its Progeny, 100 HARv. L. Ruv. 853, 867 n.65 (1987); Paust, supra note 1, at 671-72
& n.45; Carlos M. Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L.
Rv. 1082, 1097-1104 (1992); Quincy Wright, National Courts and Human Rights-The
Fujii Case, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 62, 69 (1951). But see In re Alien Children Education
Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 590 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal.
1952). Subsequent legal developments have obviated the two prongs of the Sei Fuji
rationale. See PAUST, supra note 22, at 74, 282.
Additionally, generally non-self-executing treaties can be used indirectly as aids
for interpretation of other laws, defensively in civil or criminal contexts, for
supremacy or preemptive purposes, or to provide a compelling state interest. See, e.g.,
PAUST, supra note 22, at 62-64, 68, 97-98, 134-35, 370, 377-78 n.4, 384; de ]a Vega, supra
note 22, at 457 n.206, 460, 467, 470; Paust, supra note 1, at 672 n.45.
32 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
33 Id. at 230-31, citing Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929). On supremacy
more generally, see Asakura, 265 U.S. at 341; Maiorano v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 213
U.S. 268, 272-73 (1909); Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 271, 274-76 (1817);
Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 348-49 (1809); Ware v. Hylton, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 237 (1796) ("every treaty," "all treaties"); Hamilton v. Eaton, 11
F.Cas. 336, 338, 340 (C.C.D.N.C. 1792) (No. 5,980); 10 F. Cas. 801, 802 (C.C.D. Pa.
1806) (No. 5,611); Page v. Pendleton, 1 Wythe Rep. 127, 129, 132 (Va. 1793); 6 U.S.
Op. Att'y Gen. 291, 292-93 (1854); PAUST, supra note 22, 51-57, 62-64, 67-68 nn.35 &
42, 92, 97, 133-35 nn.81 & 84, 143, 202, 314, 384 n.72, 386 n.100, 413.
34 ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 50.
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The United States Executive Report concerning the ICCPR also
made clear that "the Covenant will apply to state and local authori-
ties . . . [and] with respect to Article 50 . . . the intent is not to
modify or limit [United States] undertakings under the Cove-
nant[.] ''35 The successful effort in California to outlaw affirmative
action should not have prevailed because it is both inconsistent
with human rights treaties and federal policy assuring the permissi-
bility of affirmative action. 6
3. The Enhancement and Protection of State Implementay Choice
The third method recognizes the authority of states within the
United States and various municipal entities to execute human
rights treaties in a manner that more adequately assures affirmative
action and enriches the process of equality. Instruments ratified by
the United States contain a federal clause.17 Even though the in-
struments acknowledge that federal jurisdiction ends where state
and local government jurisdiction begins, these clauses do not
make the human rights treaties inapplicable as federal law.3" On
the contrary, the understandings allow state participation by effec-
tuating choice while they also assure concurrent duties to imple-
ment the treaties through federal and state processes. Thus, the
clauses create an overall responsibility for implementation in the
federal government and guarantee that, at a minimum, states can-
not deny human rights based in the treaties. 9
The ICCPR's federal clause is typical. It reads:
[T] his Convention shall be implemented by the Federal Govern-
ment to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial juris-
diction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the
state and local governments; to the extent that state and local
governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal
Government shall take measures appropriate to the Federal sys-
tem to the end that the competent authorities of the state or
local governments may take appropriate measures for fulfill-
35 Senate Committee Report, supra note 8, at 656-57.
36 See Paust, supra note 1, at 674.
37 See Senate Committee Report, supra note 8, at 659; Marian Nash (Leich), Contempo-
rary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 728
(1994) (reprinting the Senate resolution of ratification of the Race Discrimination
Convention).
38 Cf PeterJ. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
567, 576-77 (1997).
39 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 31, at 263; Paust, supra note 1, at 673-74; Elizabeth
Landry, Note, States as International Law-Breakers: Discrimination Against Immigrants and
Welfare Reform, 71 WASH. L. REv. 1095, 1116-17 (1996).
1998]
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ment of the Convention. 4°
Such a clause does not change the fact that affirmative action
is permissible under the treaty, while simultaneously fulfilling the
ICCPR's obligations. More generally, the fact that the federal gov-
ernment has jurisdictional competence to implement treaty law is
well understood.4 1 The federal clause is also relevant to whether
various entities within the federal government or the states may
proceed in mandating affirmative action. For example, the United
States may exercise its jurisdictional competence by implementing
the ICCPR, or it may allow the states to proceed to take steps to
implement it. Even if the states do not proceed, the United States
remains bound by the treaty and is ultimately responsible for do-
mestic implementation.
This ultimate responsibility for the implementation of the
ICCPR exists as a matter of general international law.4 2 It is also
evident in the federal clause of the ICCPR. The phrases "shall be
implemented" and "shall take measures appropriate to the Federal
system to the end that the competent authorities of the state or
local governments may take appropriate measures for fulfillment
of the [ICCPR]" mandate that it be implemented. Additionally,
this responsibility is especially assured by Article 50 of the ICCPR,
which requires: "The provisions of the present [ICCPR] shall ex-
tend to all parts of federal States without any limitations or excep-
tions." As David Stewart of the Office of the Legal Adviser of the
United States Department of State recognized, "Article 50 . . .was
included precisely to prevent federal states from limiting their obli-
gations to areas within the federal government's authority, a reser-
40 Senate Committee Report, supra note 8, at 659. The understanding included in the
resolution ratifying the Race Discrimination Convention reads:
[T]his Convention shall be implemented by the Federal Government to
the extent that it exercises jurisdiction over the matters covered therein,
and otherwise by the [S] tate and local governments. To the extent that
[S] tate and local governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters,
the Federal Government shall, as necessary, take appropriate measures
to ensure the fulfillment of this Convention.
Nash (Leich), supra note 37, at 728.
41 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); PAUST, supra note 22, at 97-98, 207,
256 n.468, 282, 371-72, 385; Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conven-
tions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 Am. J. INT'L L. 341, 345-46 (1995). The same
applies with respect to customary international law. See United States v. Aijona, 120
U.S. 479, 483-88 (1887); Frend v. United States, 100 F.2d 691, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1938),
cert. denied, 306 U.S. 640 (1939).
42 See RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 207
(b) & (c), reporters' note 3 (3d ed. 1987); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 27 ("A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law
as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. .. "); Henkin, supra note 41, at 346.
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vation exempting constituent units might readily be characterized
as contrary to the object and purpose of the Article, if not the
[ICCPR] as a whole."4"
With respect to the Race Discrimination Convention, the duty
to take action is even stronger. Article 2 (2) of the treaty requires
the United States, "when the circumstances so warrant," to take
"special and concrete measures" of affirmative action.' 4 Under the
federal clause, it may be left to the discretion of the United States
to exercise its jurisdictional competence in mandating special
measures or to allow states to proceed. In the event that the states
do not proceed, the United States is consequently bound by Article
2 of the Race Discrimination Convention to take action. In other
words, there is no gap in the United States duty under Article 2;
the Unites States still retains its duty, in spite of the fact that
neither the states nor federal governmental entities have pro-
ceeded to adopt special measures.
45
Individual states cannot deny the permissibility of affirmative
action assured under the treaties. Indeed, the federal clauses re-
quire that the treaties "shall be implemented ... otherwise by the
state and local governments," thereby making duties under the
treaties concurrent. Thus, the federal clause of the ICCPR, in con-
junction with both Article 50 of the ICCPR and the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution, compel states and sub-
state entities to execute and effectuate the treaty by choosing
among affirmative and permissible options while not denying
rights under the ICCPR. Likewise, the federal clause of the Race
43 David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 42 DEPAUL L.
REx'. 1183, 1201 (1993); see Senate Committee Report, supra note 8, at 656-57 ("the Cove-
nant will apply to state and local authorities . . . with respect to Article 50 . . . the
intent is not to modify or limit U.S. undertakings under the Covenant... intended to
signal . . . that the U.S. will implement its obligations under the Covenant by appro-
priate legislative, executive and judicial means, federal or state as appropriate ... "
PAUST, supra note 22, at 361, 363; Fitzpatrick, supra note 31, at 263; Landry, supra note
39, at 1116, (quoting the Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Sub-
mitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/
Add. 50, at 2-3, paras. 9, 11-12 (1995), which recognized the U.S. Government's "read-
iness ... to take such further measures as may be necessary to ensure that the States of
the Union implement the rights guaranteed by the Covenant" and the "assurances of
the Government that its declaration regarding the federal system is not a reservation
and is not intended to affect the international obligations of the United States.").
44 Race Discrimination Convention, supra note 4, at 218.
45 See Stewart, supra note 43, at 1201-02 (the U.S. remains bound under the Cove-
nant, the U.S. will also "ensure that the state and local governments fulfill their obli-
gations," and the Understanding "concerns the steps to be taken domestically by the
respective federal and state authorities").
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Discrimination Convention, coupled with the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution, compel the same.
Equally important is the fact that nothing in either of the fed-
eral clauses prohibit state or municipalities from executing or fur-
ther implementing the treaties. The clauses recognize and confer
a concurrent power to do so, especially in the phrases: "shall be
implemented... otherwise by the state and local governments...
to the extent that the state and local governments exercise jurisdic-
tion," and "to the end that competent authorities of the state or
local governments may take appropriate measures for fulfillment
of the Covenant."
Thus, each federal clause delegates and guarantees the ability
of state and local authorities to take positive steps in seeking equal-
ity through affirmative action, and to have those choices protected
as long as they are otherwise in fulfillment of the treaties.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the federal clauses provide state and local abili-
ties to participate in treaty effectuation in ways that might other-
wise have been suspect under more inhibiting notions of federal
preemption. 6
The new implementary freedom guaranteed under the treaty
regimes encourages participation and provides an opportunity for
states and sub-state entities to choose affirmative action programs
in higher education and in other fields or processes. This newer
flexibility makes sense when affirmative action is limited to reason-
able need, and circumstances vary in different states. Local author-
ities may then choose among the permissible option that it is most
46 See Harper, supra note 15, at 726 ("This is to make clear that ratification does
not preempt State and local anti-discrimination initiatives. The understanding also
makes clear that where States and localities have jurisdiction over such matters, the
Federal government will ensure compliance."); Senate Committee Report, supra note 8, at657 ("intended... that the U.S. will implement... by appropriate legislative, execu-
tive and judicial means, federal or state as appropriate, and that the Federal Govern-
ment will remove an), federal inhibition to the States' abilities to meet their
obligations."); Fitzpatrick, supra note 31, at 263-64 (an "invitation to state authorities
to: (1) provide appropriate state remedies for treaty norms; (2) assess potential pre-
emption ... ; (3) absorb international human rights norms into the common lawlawmaking enterprise; and (4) turn to international law benchmarks in interpreting
both state constitutions and statutes."); Landry, supra note 39, at 1116-17 ("expression
of the affirmative obligation of the states to implement the provisions of the Covenant
....").
More generally, states can experiment within the contours of logical and policy-
serving meaning of a treaty norm as long as there is no denial of the core of settled
meaning.
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appropriate to their needs. Such delegated discretion is especially
appropriate for public colleges and universities that face academic
choices, such as, who should participate in the learning process as
students or faculty members.4 7 Given the fact that such academic
choice is supported by compelling state interests, supplemented by
treaty law, as well as the related authority recognized in the federal
clauses, it should now be easier to defend colleges and universities
when their choices become the focus of domestic litigation. We
can help to "bring human rights home" by participating in amicus
briefs when colleges and universities are sued.
47 In turn, public colleges and universities have been delegated the power and
responsibility held by the states to make these types of choice with respect to educa-
tional processes.
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